Epistemological contextualism Problems and challenges

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María Dolores García-Arnaldos
Universidad Complutense de Madrid, España
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9998-8060

Abstract

From the point of view of epistemological contextualism, the truth-value of knowledge ascriptions or epistemic justification is context-dependent. Two other variabilist options, such as interest-relative invariantism and relativism, accept this thesis, but none of the three approaches is entirely satisfactory. Two alternatives are invariantism and epistemological deflationism, but invariantism is in no better position than variabilism. Agustín Rayo’s deflationist approach could offer a contextualist way out, but his conception of the space of possibility has the difficulty that the nature of truth is relative to the conception of logical space and still faces an
explanatory and normative challenge.

Item information
Published: Dec 28, 2023
Issue: No. 24 (2023): Palabra y Razón
Section: Artículos Dossier
DOI: https://doi.org/10.29035/pyr.24.33
Keywords: contextualism, variabilism, logical space, invariantism, deflationism

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How to Cite
Epistemological contextualism: Problems and challenges. (2023). Palabra Y Razón, 24, 33-60. https://doi.org/10.29035/pyr.24.33
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