¿Quién sabe cómo? Reexaminando las atribuciones de know-how en contexto


Felipe Morales-Carbonell https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5492-0759


La disputa entre intelectualistas y antiintelectualistas acerca del saber cómo o know-how prosigue. Kevin Wallbridge (2021) ha argumentado que ciertos patrones de atribución de know-how pueden ser explicados por una teoría intelectualista contextualista (el intelectualismo de sujeto-específico). En este ensayo, examino la propuesta de Wallbridge y argumento que los antiintelectualistas también pueden explicar esos datos apelando al rol del contexto para la atribución de habilidades.


Artículos Dossier

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